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TITLE IV'S "NEVER NEVER LAND"
WHEN AND HOW VICTORIOUS
INSURGENTS ARE TO BE INSTALLED IN
UNION OFFICE
Arthur L. Fox, II*
I. INTRODUCTION
Our story begins when insurgents win an election for union office and the defeated incumbents refuse to turn over the reins of
power. As the plot thickens, the Secretary of Labor (Secretary) either refuses to take any initiatives on behalf of the victorious insurgents, or worse, actively attempts to derail any litigation the insurgents initiate in an effort to be seated.
There are a number of variations on this simple theme. The insurgents might have won a regular, scheduled election. Or they
might have won a rerun election supervised by the Department of
Labor (DOL, Department). This rerun election might have been
compelled by a court order or it might have been the product of an
informal settlement between the Secretary and the union. Whatever
the scenario, the problem is the same, getting the victorious insurgents installed when the vanquished incumbents refuse to yield the
reins of power.
As democracy creeps slowly through the labor movement, incumbent officials are being challenged increasingly by insurgents
who are becoming increasingly successful in winning election to
union office. Of course, a democratic tidal wave is not sweeping
through unions. But, as a general proposition, democratic progress is
being made. Indeed some unions were more democratic in the 1950s,
before the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(LMRDA) 1 was enacted, than they are today.
* B.A., 1965; LL.B., 1968, University of Virginia. Mr. Fox began his career at the National Labor Relations Board. Since 1972 he has been affiliated with the Public Citizen Litigation Group in Washington, D.C., where he represents primarily individual workers, union reform caucuses and unions.

1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1985).
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Nonetheless, it seems that one law of physics is very much at
work in the union democracy field: for every action there is an equal
and opposite reaction. For every substantive LMRDA won victory
by insurgents and reformers, a new procedural obstacle seems to
arise. For insurgents who win elections, the problem is when and
how they can get installed in union office. Unfortunately, the
LMRDA does not specifically address this problem, and neither the
Secretary of Labor nor the courts, have given it serious consideration. Now that insurgents are winning elections with some frequency,
the time has come when we must deal with the problem of getting
insurgents seated, and develop a clear set of rules and procedures to
be followed by candidates, unions, the Secretary and the courts.
Given the current state of the law and the Secretary's posture, 2 when
victorious insurgents ask, "Do I use the law or a crowbar?" there is
a temptation to recommend the mechanical, rather than procedural,
solution. But, as lawyers, we have a responsibility to find legal
solutions.
To give this discussion a practical focus, three illustrations of
the problem are considered.
A.

Case #1

-

A Teamsters' Election

Linda Gregg, a member of the National Steering Committee of
Teamsters for a Democratic Union (TDU), a national, rank-and-file,
reform caucus, won a regularly scheduled election as the president of
a large Rocky Mountain Teamster local. 3 The defeated incumbent,
who had run the election, challenged it on the grounds that the return time he had allowed for the mail ballots did not afford an adequate opportunity for members who did not receive ballots to obtain
and return them before the deadline.4 In this case, before the protest
was finally resolved by the International Teamster President Jackie
Presser, Gregg was installed. However, shortly thereafter, Presser
upheld the ousted incumbent's protest, and ordered a new election. 5
This case illustrates the "keep voting 'till you elect the right candidate" syndrone.
Although Gregg won the second election by a wider margin and
2. See infra notes 61-76 and accompanying text.
3. Linda Gregg won the Teamster Local No. 435 presidential election on December 17,
1984, by a margin of 744 to 697.
4. After his election bid was denied by Teamsters Joint Council 3 on January 3, 1985,
the defeated incumbent filed an appeal with the International Teamsters Union.
5. International Teamster President Jackie Presser ordered a new election for the office
of Local 435 president on April 19, 1985.
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Presser decided to honor the results, other victorious insurgents have
not been so lucky.6 Many do not get installed. Rather, the union
leadership permits the losers to rerun the challenged election. Having consumed their vacation allowance, insurgents are often unable
to muster the resources need to conduct another campaign on the
heels of the one they just won. And even when they can do so, their
opponents, having discovered their political vulnerability, take advantage of their second bite at the electoral apple by doing whatever
is necessary, whether or not lawful, to avoid another defeat at the
polls. And, while national union officials may be quick to overturn
elections won by insurgents, they rarely overturn elections won by
incumbents. Too often, the internal union election appeals process is
a one-way street, with the traffic running against the insurgents.
B. Case #2

-

A Furniture Workers' Election

Rick Rader defeated a member of the national executive board
of the United Furniture Workers of America (UFWA) when he recently won an election as the president of a Baltimore local. 7 The
defeated officer filed a protest with his friend and mentor, UFWA
president Carl Scarbrough. Scarbrough promptly upheld the challenge, overturned the election and rather than order a new election,
he installed his protege, the vanquished candidate, for a full term of
office. This case illustrates the "What are friends for?" syndrone. 8
But wait, there's more, the plot thickens.
Rader's local and his supporters sued the UFWA under Title I
of the LMRDA 9 seeking to enjoin the losing candidate's installation
6. Linda Gregg won the second presidential election by a margin of 1,190 to 882.
Gregg's installation can be contrasted with the odysseys of other victorious insurgents, where

the end result rested in favor of the defeated incumbent. See infra notes 7-25 and accompanying text.
7.

122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2050 (D. Md. 1986).

8. Id. Carl Scarbrough, United Furniture Workers of America (UFWA) President ordered the installation of Kenneth Williams as president of Local 75A on December 27, 1985.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1982) states:
Every member of a labor organization shall have equal rights and privileges

within such organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or referendums
of the labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the

deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings, subject to reasonable
rules and regulations in such organizations's constitution and bylaws.
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1982) states:
Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and assemble freely with other members; and to express any views, arguments, or opinions;
and to express at meetings of the labor organization his views, upon candidates in an
election of the labor organization or upon any business properly before the meeting,

subject to the organization's established and reasonable rules pertaining to the con-
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pending final resolution of the matter pursuant to Title IV. 10 Despite
the plaintiffs' narrow request for relief that would not have jeopardized the Secretary's exclusive enforcement authority under Title
IV,"1 the court dismissed their suit for lack of jurisdiction after receiving an ex parte letter from the Secretary claiming
that the plain12
tiffs were plodding on his private, Title IV turf.
Thereafter, the loser was promptly installed and Rader was
forced into the ironic position of having to protest the election he had
won. Because Title IV requires the exhaustion of intra-union appeals
for up to three months, 13 Rader was first required to file an internal
union protest with the UFWA executive board. That body took its
time pondering the complex metaphysical ambiguity posed by Scarbrough's decision that a loser could be a winner before affirming that
decision. 14 Rader then filed a Title IV complaint with the Secretary
who took the full 60 days allowed by law to complete his investigation.15 Eventually, the Secretary did sue to set aside Scarbrough's
duct of meetings: Provided, That nothing herein shall be construed to impair the
right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the organization as an institution and to his refraining from conduct that would interfere with its performance of its legal or contractual obligations.
10. The UFWA elections took place on December 8, 1985. However, Williams was not
installed until after the temporary restraining order was lifted. 29 U.S.C. § 481(a) (1982)
states:
Every national or international labor organization, except a federation of national or internationai'labor organizations, shall elect its officers not less often than
once every five years either by secret ballot among the members in good standing or
at a convention of delegates chosen by secret ballot.
11. See Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526, 530-34
(1984).
12. Local 75A, United Furniture Workers of Am. v. Scarbrough 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2050 (D. Md. 1986). A motion to vacate was still pending at the time this article went to print
despite the passage of 17 months.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 482(a)(2) states that a member of a labor organization:
who has invoked such available remedies without obtaining a final decision
within three calendar months after their invocation, may file a complaint with the
Secretary within one calendar month thereafter alleging the violation of any provision of section 481 of this title (including violation of the constitution and bylaws of
the labor organization pertaining to the election and removal of officers). The challenged election shall be presumed valid pending a final decision thereon (as hereinafter provided) and in the interim the affairs of the organization shall be conducted
by the officers elected or in such other manner as its constitution and bylaws may
provide.
14. 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2050, 2052 (D. Md. 1986).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1982) states:
The Secretary shall investigate such complaint and, if he finds probable cause
to believe that a violation of this subchapter has occurred and has not been remedied, he shall, within sixty days after the filing of such complaint, bring a civil

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol4/iss2/4

4

Fox: Title IV's "Never
Never Land" When and How Victorious Insurgents
"'Never
Never Land"

1987]

action, and Rader was installed."6
However, the seven month delay resulted in political disaster.

During this period, Scarbrough's surrogate had filled vacancies and
run new elections to fill the balance of the seats on the local execu-

tive board. Thus, when Rader finally took office, he was faced with a
hostile majority on the local executive board which was effective in
paralyzing the union. Although the Department of Labor eventually

filed a new suit to overturn the elections that had stacked the board,
by that time Rader had already submitted a letter of resignation in

which he explained:
The members may not get what they want, but at least their union
may begin to function again. Unfortunately, the only ones who get
hurt in the kind of vicious political warfare we have witnessed are
17
the members.
Remember, but for the Secretary's ex parte intervention in the Title

I lawsuit, this disaster might have been avoided.
C.

Case #3

-

A Hospital Workers Election8

In a 1984 Hospital Workers' Local 1199 election, the Local
president, Dorris Turner, engaged in massive ballot fraud - destroying ballots cast by members and substituting large plastic garbage bags filled with ballots she and her cronies had marked for
themselves.' 9 The Labor Department was eventually successful in
forcing Turner to agree to a DOL-supervised rerun election in the
Spring of 1986 when the next regularly scheduled election was to
have been run in any event. After monumental union obstruction of
the Labor Department's efforts to establish fair electoral procedures,
action against the labor organization as an entity in the district court of the United
States in which such labor organization maintains its principal office to set aside the
invalid election, if any, and to direct the conduct of an election or hearing and vote
upon the removal of officers under the supervision of the Secretary and in accordance with the provisions of this subchapter and such rules and regulations as the
Secretary may prescribe. The court shall have power to take such action as it deems
proper to preserve the assets of the labor organization.
16. Although the UFWA was responsible for the conduct which the Secretary alleged to
be unlawful, the Secretary's complaint named only the Local as a defendant. The reason given
was "that is just our policy and it has always been that way." As a result, while the UFWA
participated indirectly in all phases of the litigation, it was later able to claim that the consent
decree was not binding on it, and that it could not be held accountable for any attorney fees in
the Title IV action, since it had not been a formal party.
17. Letter of resignation from Rick Rader, dated September 30, 1986.
18. Johnson v. Turner, 86-Civ. 3654 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 86-6096 (2d Cir. 1986).
19. Id. See affidavit of David White, one of the Local 1199 officials who participated in
the ballots substitution on orders from Turner.
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an election was conducted, and the insurgents won.2 0
Thereafter, the Department certified the ballot count but refused to let the insurgents take office until after it had conducted an
investigation of Turner's protest alleging, of all things, that the Department had acted unlawfully when supervising the election.21 The
insurgents went to court seeking installation pending the Department's resolution of the protest. But, as in the Furniture Workers'
case, 22 the Secretary argued that only he had the authority to install
winning candidates, and not unless or until he was ready to do so.
Because there was little, clear, decisional authority on the subject,
the court concluded that it could not grant the requested relief in the
context of a preliminary injunction proceeding. 3
In the meantime, months passed, and the Local's contract covering a majority of its members expired. Fortunately, the lame-duck
administration did not renegotiate that contract although, according
24
to the Labor Department's view of the law, it could have done so.
Eventually, the Department did reject Turner's protest and the insurgents were installed. Although their delayed installation was not
fatal to the union's interests,2 5 as in the UFWA case, it delayed the
members' receipt of the benefits of wage increases, improved work
rules, and increased health and pension insurance. Moreover, grievances were dropped, and arbitrations piled up. Everything ground to
a halt while the Department's investigation ground on.
II.

THE STATUTE, CONGRESSIONAL INTENT, AND THE REAL
WORLD

The starting point of any statutory analysis must be the language of the statute and the legislative history. Title IV of the
LMRDA provides:
The challenged election shall be presumed valid pending a final decision thereon . . . and in the interim the affairs of the organizasuch other mantion shall be conducted by the officers elected or 2in
8
ner as its constitution and bylaws may provide.

And Congress explained its intent as follows:
20.
21.
22.
23.

Johnson v. Turner, 86-Civ. 3654 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 86-6096 (2d Cir. 1986).
Id.
See supra notes 7-17 and accompanying text.
Johnson v. Turner, 86-Civ. 3654 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 86-6096 (2d Cir. 1986).

24. Id.
25. But see supra notes 7-17 and accompanying text where the union's interests were
greatly affected.
26. 29 U.S.C. § 482(a)(2) (1985).
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Since union business must not be brought to a standstill whenever
an election is challenged, it is necessary to make some provision for
the conduct of business while the proceeding is in progress. It
would be intolerable for the Government to appoint outsiders to act
as recievers. The choice lay between keeping the old officers in office or allowing the new officers to enter upon their duties even
though their right may be challenged. The latter course seems preferable. A union election shold be presumed valid until the contrary
can be reasonably established. There would be the least disruption
of normal procedure within the union if they were continued in office. However, the ultimate decisions upon this point should be
made by the labor unions themselves. Consequently, [the] section
• . .provides that pending a final court decision the affairs of the
union should be administered by the new officers or in such other
manner as the constitution and bylaws might provide. An employer
who dealt with such officers would satisfy any duties under the National Labor Relations Act. The collective-bargaining agreements
2
they negotiated would be legally binding upon the union. 7
At first glance, it would appear that Congress' intent was quite
clear: the winning candidates in union elections, whether incumbents
or insurgents, should be installed in office pending the outcome of
any protests or challenges. Then why is there so much confusion,
difficulty and delay in getting victorious insurgents installed? First,
the law is not quite as clear as might be desired if all ambiguities
were to have been eliminated. Moreover, for whatever reasons, the
Department of Labor not only will not help seat insurgents, it will
actively oppose their attempts to be seated promptly after winning
elections. 28 And finally, the Courts are reluctant to resolve the resulting confusion in the context of emergency injunction proceedings
which, unfortunately, are the most common type of proceeding in
which the issue is likely to arise.29
In the Furniture Workers' litigation,"° the union argued that
when Congress said "elections shall be presumed valid pending a final decision thereon,"31 it did not mean that the ballot tally should
be respected, but rather that the end result of the union review proc27. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1959), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE AcT OF 1959.
28. See, e.g., supra notes 3-25 and accompanying text where victorious insurgents were
not immediately installed into union office after the election.
29. Id.

30. Local 75A, United Furniture Workers of Am. v. Scarbrough, 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2050 (D. Md. 1986).
31.

29 U.S.C. § 482(a)(2) (1985).
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ess should be honored.3 2 Of course, if victorious candidates cannot be
installed until after the union has resolved election protests, then
why did Congress specify that they were to be installed pending a
final decision thereon? As we shall see, the only logical answer must
be that the term "election" means final ballot tally.33
But, while the Furniture Workers' argument is clearly inconsistent with Congress' directive, it does pose an important question: final resolution by whom - the union, the Secretary, or a court? In
the Local 1199 case,34 the Secretary claimed that he was vested with
the authority to make final decisions. Although Dorris Turner had
manipulated the 1984 election, the Secretary insisted that she was
entitled to remain in office until he had concluded his investigation
and certified the results of the 1986 election which Turner had lost. 5
The Secretary reached this result by arguing that since Turner won
the 1984 election, Congress instructed that she was entitled to be
installed and to remain in office until his final decision - not his
decision to seek to overturn the fraudulent election, but rather his
decision to certify the results of the rerun election months after Turner had been rejected at the polls.
The Secretary bolstered his argument with some linguistic gymnastics. Because Congress articulated its directive that winning candidates should be promptly installed in subsection (a) of section
402,36 the Secretary asserted that Congress must have intended that
the presumption would apply only to regularly scheduled elections
described in that subsection, not to rerun elections described in the
following subsections.3 7 Of course, the legislative history does not
concede such a fine distinction and fails to yield any support for the
Secretary's claim. On the contrary, Congress' sole concern was that
union business not be paralyzed.38 Yet, the Secretary's litigative posture in both the Furniture Workers and Local 1199 suits actually
created paralysis in these unions.3
In fact, the paralysis in these two unions was of a relatively
short duration. Typically, the Secretary's investigations of alleged
electoral misconduct span many months, and it is often years before
32. Local 75A, United Furniture Workers of Am. v. Scarbrough, 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2050, 2051 (D. Md. 1986).
33. See Hodgson v. IUE Local 485, 503 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1984).
34. Johnson v. Turner, 86-Civ. 3654 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 86-6096 (2d Cir. 1986).
35. Id.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 482(a) (1985).
37. See also Singleton v. Cory, 465 F. Supp. 14, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
38. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
39. See supra notes 3-25 and accompanying text.
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rerun elections are conducted.40 As between the victorious insurgents, and the politically discredited incumbents, Congress most certainly intended that the former should run the union during the interim. Moreover, the hiatus can be extended significantly if either
the Secretary should decide not to certify the results, or if the losing
incumbents should attempt to challenge his decision to certify the
results pursuant to Dunlop v. Bachowski.41 In addition, there is absolutely no legal or political justification for leaving the politically
vanquished incumbent officers at the union's helm during this period
which can extend from several months, to years.
It is important not to lose sight of the fact that it was the incumbents' unlawful conduct that led to the supervised rerun election
where they were rejected by the voters. If they are allowed to remain
in office while election protests are being investigated, and during the
pendency of any ensuing litigation, they will have the opportunity,
and an irresistible temptation, to spend their members' dues to litigate near-frivolous Bachowski claims for the sole purpose of retaining office a little bit longer. This result would hardly comport with
the objectives of the LMRDA 4 2 Moreover, if they should succeed in
persuading the Secretary that he should set aside his own rerun election, the relationship between the Secretary and the union will no
longer be adversarial. Having lost the rerun election, it is difficult to
imagine that the incumbent officers would not stipulate at once to a
consent decree in order to win another bite at the electoral apple. 3
And, after conducting two unlawful elections, they would secure the
40. See Note, Union Elections and the LMRDA: Thirteen Years of Use and Abuse, 81
YALE LJ. 407, 523 n.30 (1972) (average time between the contested election and the completion of the rerun is 2 years and 7 months).
41. 421 U.S. 560 (1975). Bachowski was defeated by an incumbent in a United Steelworkers of America (USWA) district office election. Thereafter, Bachowski filed a complaint
with the Secretary of Labor alleging LMRDA § 401 violations. The Secretary's investigation
determined that action on the part of the Department of Labor was unwarranted. Bachowski
brought suit in Federal District Court claiming that the election should be set aside and that
the Secretary's actions were "arbitrary and capricious." The District court held that it had
jurisdiction and found the Secretary's action was "capricious." Id. at 564. On appeal, the
Third Circuit Court reversed. Finally, the case went to the United States Supreme Court,
where the Court held that the District Court did have jurisdiction to hold that the Secretary
acted in a capricious manner. Id. at 575.
42. Title IV prohibits the expenditure of union funds to promote any candidacies. 29
U.S.C. § 481(g) (1982). Spending money to promote one's own personal fortunes is also proscribed by Title V. 29 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982). See generally McNamara v. Johnston, 522
F.2d 1157 (7th Cir. 1975).
43. In such circumstances, given the lack of adversity between the Secretary and a defendant union run by incumbent officers, one may question whether the action would qualify as
a "case or controversy" under Article III of the United States Constitution. See infra note
113.
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opportunity to conduct yet another election.
There can be little doubt that incumbents enjoy a distinct political advantage in any electoral race and this is particularly true in
unions where it is the incumbents who control the electoral process.
But, Congress most certainly did not intend for the political deck to
be so stacked in favor of incumbent union officers, and against insurgents, at least after the insurgents actually managed to win election
to office. Rather, the entire fabric of the LMRDA demonstrates a
congressional objective to put insurgents on a more equal footing
with incumbent union officials so that members would have more
than a "naked right to vote."' 44 Although the Secretary would normally allow the incumbent officers to govern unions, defend lawsuits,
and conduct rerun elections, Congress expressed a more politically
neutral preference that the candidate who won the challenged election should perform these tasks, whether the incumbent or the
45
insurgent.
Not only can serious abuses occur in the event that insurgents
are not promptly installed after winning supervised rerun elections,
but if Congress was willing to let incumbent candidates remain in
office after stealing elections, then Congress surely was not unwilling
to let insurgents take office after stealing supervised, rerun elections,
if that is possible. In fact, there is a much stronger presumption that
the candidates who win supervised, rerun elections are the legitimately elected officers since the potential for fraud is vastly reduced
during elections supervised by the Secretary. 46 That presumption
mounts when the victors are insurgents who played little or no role in
conducting the election, and who ordinarily lack the means to engage in electoral fraud. In such cases, the likelihood of the election's
being overturned is very slim. Indeed, if Congress intended to allow
victorious incumbent candidates to remain in office after having been
charged with wrongdoing in order to permit the orderly conduct of
union business, Congress surely could not have intended to deny victorious insurgents the right to govern the union after having won a
DOL-supervised, rerun election.
44.

See, e.g., Bunz v. Motion Picture Machine Operations, 567 F.2d 1117, 1121 (D.C.

Cir. 1977).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 482(a)(2) (1985) states in part that:
The challenged election shall be presumed valid pending a final decision thereon (as
hereinafter provided) and in the interim the affairs of the organization shall be
conducted by the officers elected . ..
Id. (emphasis added).
46. See, e.g., Donovan v. Local 299, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 515 F. Supp. 1274 (E.D.
Mich. 1981).
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Thus, when searching for the precise meaning of the statutory
presumption that a "challenged election shall be presumed valid
pending a final decision thereon," 47 it would be wise to heed Professor Archibald Cox's advice:
because many sections [of the LMRDA] contain calculated ambiguities or political compromises essential to secure a majority. Consequently, in resolving them the courts would be well advised to

seek out the underlying rationale without placing great emphasis
upon close construction of the words.4
What is clear in the statute and legislative history is that Congress
intended that the candidates who win at the polls should govern their
unions during the pendency of election challenges regardless how
long it takes to resolve those challenges. 49 There is no reason why
this directive should not apply with equal force and validity to DOLsupervised, rerun elections as well as to regular, scheduled elections
conducted by unions. Indeed, there are many reasons why the directive should be applied in both settings.
Having examined Congress' intent in a real-world setting, let us
return to the language of the statute to determine whether it is susceptible of a construction that is consistent with that intent. A compelling argument can be made that when Congress stated that an
"election" should be presumed to be valid pending resolution of disputes, it must have intended the term to mean the final ballot
count.50 The candidate who wins the most votes is entitled to be installed pending a final resolution of election protests unless the union
has provided in its constitution or bylaws for some other means of
governance. Futhermore, when Congress stated that the victorious
candidates should hold office pending "final decision (as hereinafter
provided)," it must have intended the last uncontested decision in
the chain which may stop at an internal union appeal, or proceed to
the Department of Labor, and eventually to the courts. After all,
Congress did elaborate in the legislative history that it expected the
winning candidates to govern the union "pending a final court decision." 51 The foregoing construction would incorporate this explicit
preference, but make allowance for the fact that election protests are
47. 29 U.S.C. § 482(a)(2) (1982).
48. Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58
MICH. L. REV. 819, 852 (1960) [hereinafter Cox]. See also Local 82, Furniture & Piano
Moving v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526, 542 n.17 (1983).
49. Cox, supra note 48, at 845.
50. 29 U.S.C. § 482(a)(2) (1982). See supra note 27.
51. Id.
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not infrequently settled short of litigation. Not only does this con-

struction harmonize the language of the statute with congressional
intent, but no other construction would uniformly achieve this
result.

52

Without one further refinement, however, this definition of the
term "final decision" is not complete. Title IV courts retain jurisdiction to resolve disputes during the course of supervised elections, and
must eventually consider the Secretary's certification of the results
and enter "a decree declaring [the victors] to be the officers of the

labor organization."5 3 One may still ask which court decision or order is the one that tolls this interim period during which the prior
election is presumed to have been valid."4 The answer which pro-

motes Congress' overall objectives, and which does not produce ab-

surd results, is to deem the "final decision" that court action which
found the election to have been tainted by unlawful conduct and ordered a rerun election to be conducted under the Secretary's
55
supervision.
This definition of "final decision" can be tested by examining
the consequences of adopting different definitions. For example, as
the Secretary contended in the Local 1199 case,56 the final decision
Congress intended is not the court order compelling a rerun election,
but rather the one accepting the Secretary's certification of the re-

sults of the rerun election. Not only must one examine the implications of this interpretation, one must also ask how it would translate
into a situation where there is a rerun election pursuant to an infor52. Any other reading of the term "final decision" could not be harmonized with the
congressional intent. See supra note 26.
53. 29 U.S.C. § 482(c)(2) (1982).
54. In the Turner case, the Secretary argued that the winning insurgents were not entitled to be seated until after he certified the validity of their election and concomitantly dismissed the election protest. But see Hodgson v. Int'l Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine
Worker's, Local 485, 503 F.2d 219, 224 (2d Cir. 1974), where the Secretary argued, and the
court found that the final decision that entitled a victorious candidate to be seated was the
order overturning the unlawful election. Although the court denied the Local 1199 insurgents'
motion for emergency injunctive relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, solely on the grounds that
they had failed to meet the criteria to qualify for such relief, the Secretary insisted in a subsequent, proceeding involving Teamsters Local 654, that the Turner court had upheld its position
that insurgents are not entitled to be installed unless or until he decides to certify the validity
of their elections. Knisley v. Teamsters Local 654, (N.D. Ohio Civ. No. C-3-86-575).
55. If this definition were employed, one might ask if the victorious candidates could not
be removed at the time this decision was issued. Indeed, while this remedy would be unusual,
it would be consistent with a construction which causes the Title IV presumption to lapse when
a court orders an election to be rerun, and it has been upheld. See Hodgson, 503 F.2d at 219,
upholding a district court order removing from union office thirty days before a rerun election
those officers whose misconduct necessitated the rerun election.
56. Johnson v. Turner, 86-Civ. 3654 (S.D.N.Y.), a.f'd, 86-6096 (2d Cir. 1986).
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mal settlement rather than court order. Would the Secretary's certification, by itself, constitute the final decision? And, to whom would
it be addressed? What would happen if the Secretary decided he
could not certify the results? Did Congress intend to confer on the
Secretary the authority to unilaterally postpone "final decisions" until after another rerun election had been conducted and the results
certified? Who should hold office during this perhaps interminable
period?
There is yet another "decision" that some might argue to be the
"final decision" in the Title IV chain. Whenever losing candidates or
their supporters contest the Secretary's decision to dismiss their postelection challenges pursuant to Bachowsk 57 - whether after an initial or a supervised, rerun election - one might argue that the
court's dismissal of that challenge is the "final decision.""8 Of
course, the longer it takes to get a final decision, the more compelling the need to install the candidates who won the contested election
so that the union's affairs may be conducted by officers who have at
least some semblance of political legitimacy.
The arguments raised by the Secretary in the Local 1199 case 9
highlight the implications of an alternate view of the term "final decision." The Secretary asserted that neither public policy, nor the
union's interests, would be served if the victorious insurgents were to
be installed immediately after the final ballot count, only to be removed several weeks or months later in the event the Department
were to uphold the incumbents' election protest.8 0 If victorious candidates were rotated so quickly in and out of office, the Secretary's
argument would be quite compelling; union stability could be
threatened. The fallacy in the Secretary's argument is that it
presumes that the illegality of the supervised election could be very
quickly determined. This argument also presumes that if the rerun
election was found to be legally defective after the victorious insurgents had been installed, they would immediately have to vacate of57.
58.

421 U.S. 560 (1975). See supra note 41.
In fact, this is what happened in the Turner case where the Secretary had obtained

an out-of-court agreement from the union to rerun the election. The Secretary's "certification"
followed the conclusion of his investigation of the election protests and came in the form of a
letter to the candidates in which he affirmed the election results and denied the protests. Al-

though the defeated incumbents immediately filed a Bachowski action, supra note 41, the
Secretary took the position that his letter constituted the "final decision" and the incumbents
would have to step down upon its issuance and permit the installation of the victorious
insurgents.
59.

Johnson v. Turner, 86-Civ. 3654 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 86-6096 (2d Cir. 1986).

60. Id.
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fice. The notion that a court can find the supervised election unlawful within a matter of weeks does not strike this author as very
plausible unless, of course, the Secretary possesses the authority to
make that determination himself. If Congress reposed this authority
with the Secretary, then it might be possible for him to initiate second rerun elections with relative speed. But, the Secretary would not
be able to bring those elections to a conclusion any faster than any
of the previous elections.
The scope of the Secretary's authority under Title IV must be
examined in order to determine whether the Secretary's grandiose
view of his statutory role is valid. 61 Title IV does confer on the Secretary the authority to investigate election complaints and, where he
concludes both that a violation has occurred and that it may have
affected the outcome of the election, to initiate a lawsuit to set it
aside.6 2 The law also provides that where a court upholds the Secretary's position and orders a supervised, rerun election, the Secretary
is to "promptly certify to the court the names of the persons
elected."'63 More, Congress sayeth not. Unless a union chooses to
forego its right to defend its election in a Title IV suit, and thus to
enter into a settlement agreement with the Department, the Secretary is powerless to overturn and rerun elections. Only a federal
court may overturn and rerun elections. 6 Regardless of whether the
election in question is a regularly scheduled, unsupervised election,
or a supervised rerun, the Secretary must meet the burden of proving
a violation which may have affected the outcome of the election. 5
61. As between the Secretary and insurgents, the Secretary has lost every major judicial
contest in which the scope of his authority was at issue. See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers,
404 U.S. 528 (1972) (rejecting the Secretary's contention that insurgent candidates could not
intervene in Title IV suits); Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975) (rejecting the Secre-

tary's claim that
gents complaints
U.S. 526 (1984)
diction whenever
62.

his decisions not to bring Title IV enforcement actions in response to insurwere unreviewable); Local 82, Furniture & Piano Moving v. Crowley, 467
(rejecting the Secretary's argument that Title I courts are divested of juristhe alleged misconduct might also have violated Title IV).

29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1982).

63. 29 U.S.C. § 482(c)(2) (1982).
64.

See Donovan v. Local 299, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 515 F.Supp. 1274, 1284 (E.D.

Mich. 1981). But see Holmes v. Donovan, 796 F.2d 173 (6th Cir. 1986), where the court
upheld an out-of-court settlement by a losing incumbent to rerun an election. Given the lack of
adversity, and the opportunity for sweet-heart deals between the Secretary and losing candidates who still control unions, one may question the wisdom of this decision. Cf. Marshall v.
Local 1010, United Steelworkers of Am., 664 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1981) (incumbents may not

secure a new election based on their own unlawful actions).
65.

Some might argue that whether the Secretary's decision is to seek a third election,

or to deny the election protest and certify the second, supervised election, is immaterial and
that both decisions need only be reviewed under Bachowski's "arbitrary and capricious" standard. See supra note 41. In fact, however, the two decisions are of a very different character
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While this should end our inquiry, let us proceed nonetheless to
determine how long the incumbent officials may retain office pending
a rerun election. It is quite true that because the Secretary supervised the election he now wants to have set aside, it may be possible

for him to obtain a court order compelling a second rerun election
more quickly than an order overturning a regularly scheduled elec-

tion. After all, members who protest regular elections must first exhaust internal union appeals for up to 90 days before filing their
complaints with the Secretary, while in rerun elections they file their
protests directly with the Secretary. 6 Having supervised the rerun
election, the Secretary may already be in possession of information
relevant to the protest and thus he may be able to conclude his investigation in fewer than the sixty days allowed by the Act. 7
Even so, the actual course of the litigation is not likely to be
shortened. Moreover, assuming the Secretary prevails in obtaining
and must be reviewed under different standards. While the standard of review of a decision to
certify may be narrow, this does not entitle the Secretary's decision not to certify be reviewed
under an equally narrow standard.
As we have seen, Congress did not give the Secretary the authority to overturn elections
unilaterally. Only a court may do so and only when it finds "upon a preponderance of the
evidence after trial upon the merits" that the election results were tainted by unlawful conduct. 29 U.S.C. § 482(c) (1982). Whether the election at issue is a regular, scheduled election
or a supervised, rerun election should make no difference. Just because the Secretary may have
supervised the rerun election does not qualify him effectively to decide its validity. In either
case, the burden should be on the Secretary to proffer evidence and meet an affirmative burden
of proof to persuade a court that it should enter an order overturning the election. Millwrights
Local Union No. 1914 v. Carroll, 654 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1981); Donovan v. Local 299 Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters, 515 F. Supp. 1274 (E.D.Mich. 1981).
By contrast, a decision by the Secretary to certify the results of a supervised, rerun election is inextricably intertwined with, and part of, a decision to deny an election protest. Obviously, the Secretary could not both certify the results of an election on the one hand, and
sustain a protest and seek another rerun election on the other hand. The Secretary's rationale
for his decision to certify the election is set forth in a single unified "statement of reasons."
Bachowski makes clear that this action by the Secretary is to be reviewed only to determine
whether it is "arbitrary and capricious." And, such review is normally limited to an examination of the Secretary's "statement of reasons" where the party opposing the Secretary's action
must carry the burden of persuasion. See Donovan v. Local 6, Washington Teachers' Union,
747 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Donovan v. Local 299, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 515 F. Supp.
1274 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Usery v. Local Union 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 543 F.2d 369
(D.C. Cir. 1976); Usery v. Local 1369, Textile Workers of Am., 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2921
(E.D.Pa. 1976). But see Doyle v. Brock, 632 F. Supp. 256 (D.D.C. 1986), appeal docketed,
No. 86-5608 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Indeed, the courts are reluctant to overturn supervised, rerun
elections unless the violations were substantial. See, e.g., Donovan v. Local 29, Blasters, Drilirunners & Miners Union, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2894 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
66. LMSE Enforcement Manual, Chapter 21, 1 87-89.
67. But see Donovan v. Local 29, Blasters, Drillrunners & Miners Union, 521 F. Supp.
595 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Secretary's investigation of a supervised election required eleven months
to complete); Donovan v. Local 299, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 515 F.Supp. 1274 (E.D. Mich.
1981) (seven months to investigate a supervised election).
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an order compelling the union to conduct yet another election, it is
unlikely that a third election could be conducted any faster than any
of the preceding elections. Election notices would still have to be
mailed, and "a reasonable opportunity [must] be given for the nomination of candidates . . . " who would then have a right to send

mailings and otherwise to campaign before the election could be conducted. 68 The election process can consume many months depending
on the union's constitutional procedures which may require the accumulation of signatures on nominating petitions, and may also require the conduct of the election over a period of weeks, or even
months.6 9 Consequently, it is unlikely that member protests challenging supervised rerun elections can be finally resolved, or new elections conducted, much faster than protests of regularly scheduled
elections. Therefore, there is no empirical basis for making an exception to the congressional directive that the candidates who win the
most votes should be the ones who govern unions pending final court
decisions on the legality of supervised, rerun elections on the grounds
that such elections can be conducted on a quick turn-around basis.
Finally, the Secretary's argument assumed that if victorious insurgents were to be installed after winning a rerun election, they
would have to step down once he concluded that their election was
invalid.70 Although it is undoubtedly true that the presumption of
68. 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1985) provides that:
In any election required by this section which is to be held by secret ballot a
reasonable opportunity shall be given for the nomination of candidates and every
member in good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate and to hold office (subject to section 504 of this title and to reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed)
and shall have the right to vote for or otherwise support the candidate or candidates
of his choice, without being subject to penalty, discipline, or improper interference
or reprisal of any kind by such organization or any member thereof. Not less than
fifteen days prior to the election notice thereof shall be mailed to each member at
his last known home address. Each member in good standing shall be entitled to one
vote. No member whose dues have been withheld by his employer for payment to
such organization pursuant to his voluntary authorization provided for in a collective bargaining agreement shall be declared ineligible to vote or be a candidate for
office in such organization by reason of alleged delay or default in the payment of
dues. The votes cast by members of each local labor organization shall be counted,
and the results published, separately. The election officials designated in the constitution and bylaws or the secretary, if no other official is designated, shall reserve for
one year the ballots and all other records pertaining to the election. The election
shall be conducted in accordance with the constitution and bylaws of such organization insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this subchapter.
69. When the election is conducted by mail, the ballots are generally not returnable for
several weeks. Some unions, whose members are away from home and balloting locations for
lengthy periods, specify that the polls shall remain open for much longer periods. The Masters,
Mates & Pilots Union, for example, conducts its elections over a period of three months.
70. See supra note 15.
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validity, and the right to hold office, runs only until a final decision, 7x
there is no reason why insurgents who win elections should be
treated by the Secretary, or in the eyes of the law, any differently
than incumbents. Almost without exception, the officers whose elec-

tions are overturned are allowed to conduct the supervised, rerun
elections. There is no basis for applying this rule on a discriminatory
basis and denying insurgents the right to conduct rerun elections
while allowing incumbents to do so.
Should the Secretary be concerned about preserving the union's
assets, or obtaining a fair and lawful rerun election, the law gives
him the right to seek special relief from the courts.7 A court has the

authority to "take such action as it deems proper to preserve the
assets of the labor organization.

17

3

A court may also enter appropri-

ate orders during the course of a supervised election to compel the
union to adopt, or refrain from adopting, rules or procedures that are
inconsistent with the law.7 4 Moreover, where the circumstances war-

rant, the Secretary may also seek removal of officers, if necessary, to
75
insure that the election will be conducted in a lawful manner.
However, the Secretary's assumption that victorious insurgents
would have to step down from office in the event a second rerun
election is ordered76 is without legal foundation. The Secretary's position reflects a bias against insurgents and favors incumbent union
officials.
III.

THE LOGISTICS OF LITIGATION

A complete discussion of the substantive law of the LMRDA
can not be conducted in a procedural vacuum. The realities of the
71. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
72. 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1985).
73. Id. See, e.g., Brennan v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 87 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2607 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (court appointed a trustee to preserve union assets pending the outcome
of the disputed election); Brennan v. Connecticut State U.A.W. Community Action Program
Council, 373 F. Supp. 286 (D. Conn. 1974) (court suggested that the union agree to refrain
from expending funds in support of political parties or candidates in new union elections).
74. See, e.g., Usery v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 543 F.2d 369, 375 n. 7 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (district court enjoined the union from "subjecting any of its members to penalty,
discipline or improper interference in violation of section 401

. .

. "); Brennan v. Connecticut

UAW, Community Action Program Council, 373 F. Supp. 286, 288 (D. Conn. 1974); Brennan
v. Local 551, United Automobile Workers of Am., 486 F.2d 6, 7, (9th Cir. 1973); Wirtz v.
Independent Workers Union of Florida, 272 F. Supp. 31, 34 (N.D. Fla. 1967) (court held that
the union could not discriminate against the complainant); Wirtz v. Local 1752, Int'l Longshoremans Ass'n, 56 L.R.R.M. (B.N.A.) 2303, 2304 (S.D. Miss. 1963) (plaintiff suffered from
discrimination, financial loss and standing in the union).
75. Hodgson, 503 F.2d at 219.
76. See supra notes 3-28 and accompanying text.
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legal process must also be recognized. And, to some extent, these
realities may shape, or reshape, our view of the substantive law. Successful candidates will usually seek to be installed either after an
initial, unsupervised election,77 or after a second, rerun election
which was supervised by the Department of Labor.7 8 However, the
Title IV legal process is not readily available to an insurgent who
wins an unsupervised election where the incumbents refuse to step
down, or when a higher union body issues a decision overturning the
election and orders a new election. Let us examine what legal recourse the insurgents may have in such circumstances.
The first, and most serious obstacle the insurgents will encounter is the Secretary of Labor. Congress did not give union members
standing to initiate lawsuits to enforce Title IV rights. 79 Rather,
Congress conferred that right on the Secretary, and it further provided in section 403 that "[t]he remedy provided by this title for
challenging an election already conducted shall be exclusive." 80 That
remedy is a court order overturning an unlawful election and directing a new election to be conducted under the Secretary's supervision.81 And it is available only in lawsuits initiated by the Secretary.
Thus, it has been held that courts are without jurisdiction to award
relief under Title IV to anyone other than the Secretary. 82 Accordingly, the Secretary believes that he possesses the exclusive right to
obtain an insurgent's installation. However, in practice he has refused to do so promptly after the insurgent's election. Rather, he has
invariably investigated the insurgent's election first to satisfy himself
that it was lawful, and only then has he taken action to seat the
insurgent. In the meantime, the union may be thrown into a state of
chaos, as in the Furniture Workers8" and Local 119984 cases. And,

where the Secretary concludes that the insurgent's election may not
have been lawful, although no court has so found, the Secretary refuses to take any initiative to seat the winning candidate. 85 One cannot help but wonder if the Department is not attempting to undermine congressional intent on behalf of its political constituency, the
77. See supra notes 3-17 and accompanying text.
78.

See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.

79. Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140 (1964).
80. 29 U.S.C. § 483 (1982).
81. 29 U.S.C. § 482(c) (1982).
82. Driscoll v. Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, Local 139, 484 F.2d 682 (7th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974).
83. See supra notes 7-17 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Knisley v. Teamster Local 654, N.D. Oh., Civ. No. C-3-86-575.
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incumbent leadership of the nation's labor unions, that naturally
want to promote the status quo.
Giving the Department the benefit of the doubt, one can imagine how it might be concerned about the possibility of being caught
in a seemingly compromised position. Thus, the Department may
worry that if it were first to install an insurgent, then investigate the
election and conclude that it was unlawful, and finally sue to overturn the insurgent's election, its actions would be seen as being arbitrary and inconsistent. To protect its image and to avoid taking this
seemingly inconsistent action, the Department may feel justified in
postponing the installation of insurgents. Undoubtedly, courts would
share the same concern about their own image. However, there is no
inconsistency between actions to overturn elections, and actions to
seat victorious candidates. Congress has provided both when and
how elections may be overturned and when victorious candidates are
to be installed. Neither the Secretary nor the courts should be second-guessing the judgment of Congress.
Inasmuch as Congress provided that unions should be governed
by victorious candidates pending resolution of election protests, the
Secretary's action to seat victorious insurgents should seek only temporary relief. The Secretary would still be bound to investigate any
election protests that might be filed, and to seek to overturn the election in the event that the Secretary concluded the election was
tainted by unlawful conduct. The courts could avoid issue preclusion
claims that might be raised in subsequent actions by specifying that
the judicial inquiry during the installation proceeding was limited
exclusively to determining whether the insurgent candidate won a
majority of the votes; the lawfulness of the election would be beyond
the scope of the court's inquiry in any installation proceeding.86
The Secretary might also argue that his policy of refusing to
assist the installation of victorious insurgents is justified because the
law only authorizes him to initiate suits to overturn elections. The
suits to install election winners. However, the Secretary has taken
action to bring suits to affirm, as well as overturn, union elections,
and to install the candidates who win lawful elections.87 Thus, while
it is unlikely that the Secretary would argue in favor of any such
limitation on his authority one may expect this argument to be made
by the incumbent union officials in an effort to retain office. But, if
86. See Donovan v. Local 299, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 515 F. Supp. 1274, 1284-86
(E.D. Mich. 1981).

87. See, e.g., Brock v. Local 75A, United Furniture Workers of Am. Civ. M-86-921 (D.
Md., 1986) (the Secretary set aside the election and the victorious insurgents sued to install).
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neither the Secretary, nor the union members, can bring a lawsuit to
install union election winners, who can? If no one can bring suit,
how is the congressional presumption and mandate to be enforced? 88
While Title IV speaks only of suits by the Secretary to overturn
and rerun elections, the Secretary has successfully prosecuted actions
to affirm valid elections and install the victorious candidates,89 albeit
only after concluding normal post-election investigations." One
could logically extrapolate from these decisions the authority for the
Secretary to sue to install elected insurgents prior to the conclusion
of investigations of any election protests, pursuant to Congress' section 402(a)(2) directives.91
Unfortunately, waiting for the Secretary to reform his Title IV
mindset may be like "Waiting for Godot." Therefore, the legal actions victorious candidates might pursue on their own should be explored. In Kupau v. Yamamoto,9 2 an insurgent who won an election
which the union overturned, won a preliminary injunction compelling
the union to install him in office. He and his supporters in the union
brought their suit under Title I.93 Both the union and the Secretary
argued that despite the plaintiffs having brought their action under
Title I, in reality it was an action arising under Title IV which only
the Secretary could initiate." The court reasoned that while
"[s]ection 483 does state that section 482 is the exclusive remedy for
challenging an election already conducted[,] [p]laintiffs... are defending the validity of the election." 95 As to the plaintiff's Title I
claim, the court held that the union members':
right to nominate candidates and to vote in elections would be
meaningless if, after having nominated and voted for a successful
candidate, they are nevertheless deprived of his services as an
elected official due to defendants' concerted actions to subvert the
88.

In Crowley, 467 U.S. at 542 n.20, the Supreme Court seemed to suggest that it was

the Secretary's responsibility to enforce the presumption that elections were valid pending final
decisions.
89. Donovan v. Local 831, Int'l Bhd. of Painters, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2336 (C.D. Cal.
1982). Cf. McDonald v. Oliver, 400 F. Supp. 660 (S.D. Miss. 1974), affd, 525 F.2d 1217 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976).
90. See supra note 87.
91. Moreover, Congress has assigned to the Secretary a role in seating the winners of
rerun elections by requiring him to "certify to the court the names of the persons elected, and
the court shall thereupon enter a decree declaring such persons to be the officers . . . ." 29

U.S.C. § 482(c)(2) (1982).
92.
93.
94.
95.

455 F. Supp. 1084 (D. Haw. 1978), aff/d, 622 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1086.
Id. at 1086-87.
Id. at 1087.
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results of a valid election.96

The court relied on the Title IV presumption that challenged elections shall be presumed to be valid only for the purpose of devising
97
appropriate relief in the Title I action.
To some degree, Kupau was a daring decision because courts
had previously held that when a union member's Title I claim was
asserted during or after an election, and overlapped a possible claim
the Secretary might make in a Title IV action, the exclusivity language in Title IV had the effect of depriving the court of jurisdiction
over the Title I claim. 98 However, in Local 82, Furniture & Piano
Moving v. Crowley,99 the Supreme Court resolved this jurisdictional
uncertainty and effectively upheld Kupau. The Court held that lower
courts are not divested of jurisdiction over Title I actions simply because the action may also implicate rights conferred by Title IV. 100
The Court found that the exclusivity language in Title IV related
only to the relief made available by Title IV.101 Thus, the Court held
that as long as the plaintiffs in a Title I suit do not seek to challenge
the validity of an election already conducted, and as long as the
court can remedy the Title I violations without substantially delay102
ing an ongoing election, jurisdiction would lie in Title I to do So.
Kupau should serve as a litigation model for insurgents who are
denied the right to be seated in accordance with their unions' constitutional procedures after winning regular, scheduled elections. 103
Kupau should also serve as a model for securing installation following a supervised rerun election. However, in this setting, there may
be additional problems stemming from the Secretary's active involvement in the election and the court's reluctance to grant relief op96.

Id. at 1090. This language may have been borrowed from Schonfeld v. Penza, 477

F.2d 899, 903 (2d Cir. 1973). Since both the Kupau and Schonfeld decisions predated Crow-

ley, the courts felt it necessary to distinguish Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964), in
order to uphold their jurisdiction under Title I. In light of Crowley, however, there would no
longer appear to be any need to find that the Title I violation was part of a deliberate cam-

paign to suppress opposition.
97.

Kupau, 455 F. Supp. at 1091.

98. Driscoll v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 139, 484 F.2d 682 (7th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974).
99. 467 U.S. 526 (1984).

100. Id. at 538-50.
101.
102.

Id. at 541-43.
Id. at 549-50.

103. If the union could demonstrate that it had scheduled a very prompt rerun election
and that its stability could be subverted if the insurgents were seated and then defeated, the
balance of the equities and potential hardships would make it more difficult to secure injunctive relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1987

21

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1987], Art. 4
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 4:2

posed by the Secretary.'"
For the purpose of discussion, assume a scenario where insurgent candidates lost the first election, and won the second, rerun
election. 10 5 If the rerun election was held pursuant to a court order,
then the court will have ongoing jurisdiction to review the results
and certify the winners to be the lawful officers. The insurgents may,
or may not, have intervened during the initial stages of that proceeding. If the insurgents were intervenors, their role would have been
limited by the decision in Trbovich v. United Mine Workers 06 to
participating in the Secretary's shadow in a case whose prosecution
he controlled. 107 Nonetheless, in Trbovich the Supreme Court found
"no reason to prevent the intervenors from assisting the court in
fashioning a suitable remedial order."108 Thus, once the Secretary
has tallied the ballots, though not yet certified the validity of the
rerun election, the insurgents should be installed. Furthermore, the
insurgents should be allowed to apply to the court for a temporary
restraining order compelling their immediate installation under the
theory that this relief is a fitting and equitable remedy.109 If the insurgents had not participated as intervenors in the Title IV suit, once
the Secretary fails or refuses to seek their installation upon certifying the election results, the insurgents should be entitled to intervene
at that, albeit late, phase in the Title IV proceeding and request the
court to order their installation.110 Of course, in light of the heavy
burden placed on parties seeking preliminary injunctions, and the
courts' general respect for governmental institutions, if the Secretary
opposes the insurgent's motion for injunctive relief, the insurgents
will face an uphill battle.""'
104. See, e.g., Singleton v. Cory, 465 F. Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
105. Hopefully, if the insurgents had won the first election, they would have gotten in-

stalled before running, and winning, the second election.
106.
107.

404 U.S. 528 (1972).
Id.

108.

Id. at 537 n.8.

109.

While there is a lame duck period following most regularly scheduled union elec-

tions, union constitutions do not usually make any provision for installation, much less delayed
installation, of candidates who might happen to win rerun elections. And even if they did, it is
unlikely that the provision would be upheld as being consistent with Title IV.
110. Insurgents may argue that intervention is timely because their interests had been
protected by the Secretary until such time as he refused to seat them. At that point, their
interests became adversary and it became necessary for the insurgents, for the first time, to
intervene in order to preserve their rights. United Airlines v. MacDonald, 432 U.S. 385
(1977); Flight Attendants v. Gibbs, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3167 (5th Cir. 1986). See also
Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators,81 HARV.
L. REv. 721, 729-34, 746 (1968).
111. See supra notes 7-25 and accompanying text. In the event the Secretary were to
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Nonetheless, the insurgents should be able to gain some advantage by pointing out that if they are not installed, the incumbent

administration will capitulate to the Secretary in what would
amount to a sweet-heart lawsuit. Naturally, the Secretary and incumbent officers might argue, in unison, that the insurgents could
still raise their defenses in their role as intervenors.1 12 However, it

would stretch and warp the judicial process beyond recognition to
have both the plaintiff and defendant aligned against the intervenor,
not on some peripheral issue, but on the merits of the basic underlying case or controversy - the lawfulness of the election. 1 3 This funcomplete his post-election investigation and conclude that he could not certify the election
before the insurgents seek to be installed, the deck could become even more politically stacked
against the insurgents even though, as a matter of law, it should not make any difference.
112. A number of courts have held that intervenors' counsel are entitled to fees where
they make a substantial contribution to the successful outcome of Title IV litigation. E.g.,
Donovan v. CSEA Local Union 1000, 784 F.2d 98 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, CSEA Local
Union 1000 v. Brock, 107 S.Ct. 74 (1986). However, it is still difficult for insurgents to find
competent counsel willing to work on this sort of contingency. Thus, as long as the insurgents
remain out of office, they are not likely to be able to afford to mount a very aggressive legal
defense.
113. On the other hand, the courts are divided whether defeated incumbents can intervene to challenge the Secretary's decision to certify rerun elections they lost. The Ninth and
Tenth Circuits have upheld the denial of motions to intervene. Usery v. District 22, United
Mine Workers of Am., 567 F.2d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 1978); Brennan v. Silvergate District
Lodge No. 50, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 503 F.2d 800, 806 (9th Cir. 1974). Other courts have
permitted intervention. Donovan v. Westside Local 174, United Automobile Workers of Am.,
783 F.2d 616, 623 (6th Cir. 1986); Usery v. Local Union No. 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
543 F.2d 369, 376-79 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Hodgdon v. Carpenters Resilient Flooring Local
Union No. 2212, 457 F.2d 1364, 1369 (3rd Cir. 1972). If those wishing to challenge the
Secretary's certification are denied the right to intervene, they are effectively denied their
rights under Backowski, 421 U.S. at 560. Once a court accepts the Secretary's certification of
an election, there is little likelihood that it would overturn itself if the incumbents subsequently
filed a Backowski suit. The better time to resolve any uncertainties concerning the validity of
the election is during the certification proceeding.
This conflict highlights the procedural awkwardness of certification proceedings. During
the initial phase of a Title IV suit, the Secretary (plaintiff) and the defeated insurgents (intervenors) are generally aligned against the union and the victorious incumbents. But, if the insurgents win the court-ordered election, there will be a realignment of interests among the
parties. At this point, the defeated incumbent officers would like to see the rerun election
overturned and the insurgents are anxious to defend the status quo. If the incumbent officers
are allowed to remain in office pending the resolution of any election protests, they may be
able to use the union's resources to overturn the election. Furthermore, if the Secretary should
decide to certify the results, the defeated incumbents could use the defendant-union as a vehicle for voicing their Backowski objections to the Secretary's decision. Of course, for the defeated officers to hold the union as a hostage and use it in this manner would be highly improper. To the extent the union should play any role other than that of a stakeholder, it should
be defending the election conducted in its name. This result, however, can only be assured if
the victorious insurgents are promptly installed after the Secretary has tallied the votes.
On the other hand, if the Secretary decides not to certify the rerun election, and if the
defeated incumbents are still in control of the union, there is no adversity between the plain-
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damental point must ultimately be recognized, if not by the Secretary, then at least by the courts, as the most compelling reason why
victorious insurgents must be installed after winning an election,
whether or not the Secretary should eventually decide to certify the
validity of the election. Where this argument is presented to a court
that has presided over a Title IV action and ordered a rerun election,
the court will have acquired a sufficient familiarity with the law and
the parties to appreciate the new alignment among the parties and
the potential for judicial abuse. One would hope that these courts
will be willing to act independently to override the Secretary's asserted discretion to decide whether and when to seat victorious candidates and to enforce Congress' presumption that elections should
be presumed to be lawful until a court affirmatively finds that they
were not.
Finally, assume the scenario where the insurgents have won a
supervised, rerun election conducted pursuant to a private, out-ofcourt agreement between the Secretary and the union." 4 In this
case, there is no court with continuing jurisdiction over a Title IV
proceeding to which the insurgents might appeal for assistance obtaining their installations. As a result, the insurgents would probably
have no choice but to initiate a Title I suit modelled after Kupau.
But, as difficult as it may be for insurgents to win such cases against
just their union, the difficulty becomes almost insuperable when they
must show that both their union and the Secretary have acted improperly in refusing to install them after a rerun election.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Department of Labor is the major obstacle for insurgents
who seek to be installed following their election to union office but

before the Department has concluded its post-election investigation
tiff-Secretary and the defendant-union. The only potential adversity would be between the

Secretary and the victorious insurgent-intervenors whose interests had previously been aligned
during the Title IV litigation. But this assumes that the victorious insurgents were parties in
that litigation. If they did not intervene, there would be no adversity among the parties, and
the Secretary and the union, still under the control of the defeated incumbents, could enter
into a highly suspect agreement to run yet another election.
Again, the only way to prevent this result would be to install the victorious candidates.
This would perpetuate the adversity between the Secretary and the union, and place the insurgents in a position where they could either accede to the Secretary's request that the union
conduct another rerun election or force the Secretary either to file a new action, or an
amended complaint, and meet his burden of proof imposed by Title IV of the LMRDA. This
situation would be fair to all concerned because the union's resources, and those of the United
States Government, would not be pooled against relatively impecunious officers-elect.
114. This was the situation facing the insurgents in the Turner case.
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of alleged election irregularities. If the Department's historic posture
in such proceedings has been the product of inattention, rather than
political bias, one might hope that it would be willing to re-examine
and modify its position. Too often, however, the Department has
been willing to alter its historic enforcement policies that have
benefitted incumbent union administrations only after receiving some
form of "firm judicial guidance."
When insurgents go to court, however, they encounter another
obstacle. Courts are reluctant to resolve this debate in the context of
emergency injunction proceedings which, unfortunately, are the most
common type of proceeding in which the debate is likely to be aired.
Additionally, most courts insist that the party seeking either a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction make a strong
showing of their legal right to such relief. Since most courts will be
deferential to the Secretary, given his enforcement role under Title
IV, the courts will be reluctant to find that the insurgents have met
their heavy burden once the Secretary disputes the insurgents' right
to be installed following their election. Even though the Secretary's
position vis a vis seating victorious insurgents is without legal foundation, few courts are going to be willing to subject the Secretary's
position to close scrutiny in an expedited injunction hearing. And,
months later when the courts have the time to analyze the legal arguments in a deliberative manner, most cases will have become
moot. As a result, the Secretary is positioned so that if he chooses,
he may be able effectively to undermine congressional intent for
some time to come.
However, once the Secretary alters his policy voluntarily, or the
courts take the time to analyze the law carefully and to issue decisions affirming congressional intent that victorious candidates should
be seated pending final decisions as to their validity of their elections, the tide should quickly turn. At that point, a body of decisional law will begin to develop which will furnish reluctant courts
with a clear legal foundation to support injunctions ordering unions
to promptly install insurgent candidates who have been elected to
office.
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